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Abstract: Persuading people to choose strong passwords is challenging. One way to influence 
password strength, as and when people are making the choice, is to tweak the choice architecture 
to encourage stronger choice. A variety of choice architecture manipulations i.e. “nudges”, have 
been trialled by researchers with a view to strengthening the overall password profile. None has 
made much of a difference so far. Here we report on our design of an influential behavioural 
intervention tailored to the password choice context: a hybrid nudge that significantly prompted 
stronger passwords. 
 
We carried out three longitudinal studies to analyse the efficacy of a range of “nudges” by 
manipulating the password choice architecture of an actual university web application. The first 
and second studies tested the efficacy of several simple visual framing “nudges”. Password 
strength did not budge. The third study tested expiration dates directly linked to password 
strength. This manipulation delivered a positive result: significantly longer and stronger 
passwords. Our main conclusion was that the final successful nudge provided participants with 
absolute certainty as to the benefit of a stronger password, and that it was this certainty that made 
the difference. 
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Introduction 
The first encounter with a new system or service, for many, requires the creation of a secret 
password. This is often seen, by computer users, as something of an obstacle to be hurdled in 
order to gain access (Pernice 2015). The frequency of password requests leads to poor password 
choices, creating a vulnerability to be exploited by hackers (Kritzinger & von Solms 2010). 
Strong passwords are costly, in terms of memory and typing effort. Strong passwords require 
people to memorize long and random strings and this is poorly matched to human memory 
capabilities. Moreover, password entry is arduous, especially on soft keyboards (Schaub, et al. 
2012, Greene, et al. 2014). 
 
Because passwords, as a mechanism, encourage weak choices, the obvious course of action is 
replacement of the password mechanism (Keith, et al. 2009, Solove & Hartzog 2015, Warkentin, 
et al. 2004). However, this is proving harder than anticipated (Hern 2016, Stross 2008, Bonneau, 																																																								*	Correspondence	to:	Cybersecurity	Division,	Abertay	University,	Dundee,	DD1	1HG,	United	Kingdom.	Email:	k.renaud@abertay.ac.uk	
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et al. 2012). The inertia generated by millions of existing systems already using passwords 
means they are probably going to persist for the foreseeable future (Bonneau, et al. 2015, 
Bonneau & Preibusch 2010). 
 
There are systems that address the problem by removing free choice and instead forcing strong 
passwords upon users (Crawford 2013). Users are then more likely to forget and often re-set 
passwords, or cope by writing passwords down. Depending on the context and the threat model, 
recording passwords is not necessarily ill-advised. It might even contribute to overall security. 
For example, sticking a note with a strong password to the monitor helps the person to use a 
strong password without risking forgetting it. Certainly a remote attacker cannot obtain it, but 
people who are physically co-present will find it trivial to get into the person’s account. When 
this is not an issue, writing passwords down is a great compromise. Still, storing written 
passwords insecurely, or sharing them, can potentially weaken the password mechanism, 
especially when no one notices the password record any more, and it is inadvertently leaked 
(Cluley 2012). Further potential side effects of forced passwords are frustration and a reactance 
response that could lead to users compromising security in other ways (Brehm & Brehm 1981). 
 
Another alternative is to provide users with a free choice but subtly to influence choice in a way 
that “alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without significantly changing their economic 
incentives” (Thaler & Sunstein 2008, p.6). The term “nudging”, to denote this kind of 
manipulation, was coined by Thaler and Sunstein in 2008 and has been applied in a broad range 
of areas (Halpern 2015) including politics, economics and environmental policies. Nudges have 
also been trialled to encourage safe, healthy or sustainable behaviour, by using so-called “green 
nudges” (Schubert 2017). 
 
The field of interest here is IT security, where the researchers’ main aim was to steer people 
towards more secure behaviours i.e. stronger passwords. Within the authentication context, 
various nudges have been trialled subtly to sway users towards stronger passwords. However, the 
results have been inconclusive so far (Egelman, et al. 2013). For instance, Vance, et al. (2013) 
found that password strength meters only influenced password strength in conjunction with an 
interactive fear appeal treatment condition that included a message highlighting the seriousness 
of the threat. An interactive password strength meter in conjunction with a static fear appeal did 
not change password strength significantly. 
 
In this paper we report on three consecutive longitudinal studies we carried out to test the 
efficacy of a range of choice architecture manipulations. These were trialled in the wild, using 
the enrolment page of a frequently-used university web application. When the first set of nudges 
did not prove efficacious, we followed Sunstein’s (2017) advice for actions to take when nudges 
fail. We first tested a different set of nudges. When these also failed, we formulated a multi-
pronged hybrid nudge, including the use of an economic incentive and a reminder. This had the 
desired effect. 
 
We report on the design of our studies, and the results. We discuss our findings and reflect on the 
implications for the wider research community and for password “choice architecture” design. 
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Related work 
Nudging is an increasingly popular technique (Hevner & Chatterjee 2010) that manipulates the 
choice architecture (the user interface, in our context) to encourage people to take what the 
nudge designer considers to be the wiser option. It does so gently, rather than compelling or 
coercing, something the word “nudge” describes very well. Nudging emerged from the field of 
behavioural economics, but other fields also report on a range of phenomena where people’s 
behaviour has been changed by small and inexpensive interventions (Bateson, et al. 2013, 
Dijksterhuis, et al. 2000). 
 
Some consider nudges worth investigating (Oliver 2011, Turland 2016). Others are unconvinced, 
believing them to be a passing fad (Rayner & Lang 2011). It certainly seems that the field is still 
lacking the underlying scientific principles that would make it trivial to design nudges for new 
contexts. This is probably due to the relative newness of this field. The evidence is being 
accumulated, and models constructed, with every new study carried out. 
 
Nudges have indeed been trialled in the IT security area. One security-related study (Jeske, et al. 
2014) used a nudge to persuade people to choose a more secure Wi-Fi by using colour and menu 
order. They reported that nudges could be effective, but that personal differences also played a 
role in security decisions. Yevseyeva, et al. (2016) also experimented with the use of influential 
techniques to steer people towards the most secure Wi-Fi option. Among other insights, they 
found that adding a padlock symbol had the highest impact, but also that the influence decreased 
as the number of options increased, and that different clusters of decision-makers existed. This 
highlights the challenge of designing a nudge that will influence a broad base of users. 
 
Privacy researchers have deployed nudges with more success. One study (Choe, et al. 2013) used 
positive visual framing to direct people away from privacy-invasive apps on Smart phones. 
Balebako, et al. (2011) make the case for moving away from a hurdle to a paternalistic approach, 
i.e. nudging, especially when it comes to privacy. Later research by the same team of researchers 
(Almuhimedi, et al. 2015) showed that they were able to make people more aware of privacy 
invasions by rendering data sharing activities visible. People acted upon their new awareness, a 
very strong result. 
 
Authentication nudges attempt to encourage strong passwords, where the default choice would 
usually be a weak password. Overall, authentication nudge studies have not yet been as 
successful in delivering change when deployed in the wild (Ciampa 2013, Egelman, et al. 2013, 
Josiam & Hobson 1995, Seitz, et al. 2016). One authentication-specific nudge effort that has 
enjoyed a great deal of research attention is the password strength meter. These mechanisms 
provide strength feedback, either post-entry or dynamically. Mechanisms can provide colour 
indicators, strength indicator bars, or informative text (de Carné de Carnavalet 2014). 
Sotirakopoulos (2011) attempted to influence password choice by providing dynamic feedback. 
No difference emerged between passwords chosen, either in the presence of a horizontal strength 
meter, or in the presence of a comparison to peer passwords. 
 
Vance, et al. (2013) also reported that password strength meters, on their own, did not impact 
password strength in their field test. Ur, et al. (2012) compared a number of different password 
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strength meters and discovered that meters influenced password strength. However, they tested 
their meters using the crowdsourcing internet marketplace Mechanical Turk that is often used for 
large-scale studies. This constitutes an essential first step in exploring the potential of any 
intervention. However, it also constitutes an artificial setting that might have led to somewhat 
artificial passwords. Similarly, Khern-am-naui, Yang & Li (2016) used Mechanical Turk to test 
the influence of warning messages on the impact of strength meters. Their results were mixed. 
The increase in password strength (compared to absolute password strength) was significantly 
greater in one treatment group, where users received a warning message that contained strength 
and rank of the password, than in the control group.  However, the absolute strength of 
passwords generated for different scenarios did not differ significantly between treatment groups 
and control group.  
 
The promising findings reported by these researchers gave others the confidence to attempt the 
natural next step: testing the nudges in the wild. For instance, Egelman, et al. (2013) tested the 
impact of password meters in the wild, but reported that the meters made no difference to 
password strength, unless users perceived the account to be important. 
 
Apart from password strength meters, a few other forms of nudges have been tested in the 
authentication context. For example, Von Zezschwitz, et al. (2016) attempted to increase the 
effectively-used password space for Android unlock patterns by displaying background images 
and animations during the password creation process. Unfortunately, a large number of 
participants did not even notice the background image and only a few were positively affected. 
The effect of the nudge was limited by the influence of strong habits such as left-to-right-
reading/writing, called counter-nudges by Sunstein (2017). 
 
Seitz, et al. (2016) tried to nudge people towards stronger passwords by making use of the decoy 
effect. That is, if you want people to choose a particular option you display an unattractive 
alternative (the decoy) to make the other option more attractive. In the study participants were 
shown two alternatives to their self-selected weak password: a mangled password rated as 
“strong” and a passphrase rated as “very strong”. Results were mixed. Most suggestions were 
rejected and the nudging power seemed limited. Thus, the authors suggested making the benefits 
of stronger passwords more perceivable, e.g. by extending password expiration for stronger 
passwords. 
 
It is disappointing that nudge efforts in the authentication context have not yet led to compelling 
results (Ciampa 2013, Egelman, et al. 2013). Because password choice is such an important issue 
in the field of information security, we considered it worthwhile to carry out a study to trial some 
previously-untested nudges in order to identify one that would prove efficacious. 
 
The three studies we describe here are part of a long-term project investigating the deployment 
of behavioural science techniques in authentication contexts. An earlier paper describes the 
challenges we experienced in testing our initial unsuccessful nudges in Studies 1 and 2, 
presenting the analysis and a reflection of our results in detail (Renaud & Zimmermann 2017). 
We briefly describe the two studies here to provide the reader with sufficient background to 
follow the line of argument, and because it comprises an essential part of our discussion. 
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Distinction between Simple and Hybrid Nudges 
 
Hansen (2015) developed a new nudge definition, considering Thaler and Sunstein’s definition 
to be somewhat unsatisfactory. His definition of a nudge basically encompasses nudges that 
mitigate against, and exploit, human bias in order to influence people to make wiser choices. 
This builds on Kahneman’s (2003, 2011) distinction between the two processing centres of the 
brain: System 1 being the automatic part, and System 2 being the reflective part. Humans prefer 
to engage with situations using their automatic processing because it is less effortful. Yet 
sometimes the automatic processing leads people to make unwise choices.  
 
 Hansen’s nudge definition targets Kahneman’s System 1 thinking – basically working against 
unwise outcomes and nudging people towards better decisions. We can refer to this kind of 
intervention as a “Simple Nudge” because it delivers its message primarily to the automatic 
processing part of the brain, without necessarily engaging the person in reflective System 2 
processing. Such simple nudges may be inadequate in counteracting pre-existing habitual 
behaviours, strong preferences or counter-nudges coming from the social environment (Sunstein 
2017). In this case, something more powerful might be required – an intervention that uses a 
suite of tools to effect behavioural change. This we will call a “Hybrid Nudge”: an intervention 
that targets both System 1 and 2 processing in order to influence fairly intractable behaviors by 
using a collection of carefully-chosen tools.  
 
Method and results 
First, we introduce the general study design and apparatus used in all three studies. Second, we 
introduce the nudges trialled in Studies 1, 2 and 3, along with the results and a short discussion to 
reflect on the implications of our findings. 
 
Apparatus 
A web application within the university campus network was used. The application was 
developed to provide students with coursework deadlines, timetable information and project 
allocations. It also allowed them to submit requests and access their coursework grades. To 
authenticate, students were required to provide a user identifier and an alphanumeric password. 
Access was only possible from within the campus network; individuals from outside the campus 
were not able to use the system. 
 
The strength of the password was calculated using the client-based, free and open source 
JavaScript zxcvbn.js (Wheeler 2016), a strength calculator that uses pattern matching and 
minimum entropy calculation. Among other measures, it delivers a score value between 0 and 4 
that indicates whether the number of guesses necessary to break the password is less than 10^2, 
10^4, 10^6, 10^8, or above. For example, the password “password” gets a rating of 0, where a 
password like “WinnieThePooh42!” is issued a rating of 4. The script detects 10,000 common 
passwords, prevalent English words and surnames, as well as common patterns such as dates, 
repeats (e.g. “aaa”), sequences (e.g. “abcd”), and QWERTY patterns. Calculating strength on the 
client side ensured no transmission of unhashed passwords to the server. Moreover, the script is 
used in industry by popular consumer services such as Dropbox (Wheeler 2016).  Password 
length was measured by the number of characters in the password. 
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Participants 
All participants were students, the majority of whom were enrolled in technical courses, 
predominantly specializing in Computing Science. A few other majors took individual courses in 
the school to augment their curricula. In line with the requirements of the University’s Ethics 
committee and basic ethical principles participation in the study was voluntary. Use of the web 
application was possible without participating in the study. 
 
In Study 1 a total of 587 individuals registered to use the web application and created a 
password. Of those, 497 participated in the study. In the second study 816 students registered to 
use the web application, with 776 participating in the study. The third study started with 918 and 
finally comprised 672 participants after some opted out. Because of the requirements of the 
University’s Ethics Committee, no demographic data was collected or analysed to preserve the 
students’ privacy.  
 
Procedure 
The website URL was published on a virtual learning environment and in the program guide 
issued to all students. Participants were asked to register to use the web application. The 
registration process prompted participants to create a password. Individuals wanting to use the 
website were presented with a consent form, explaining that their actions were being logged and 
could be used for research purposes. The form allowed them to opt out of the investigation, but 
still benefit from use of the website.  
 
All consenting participants were randomly assigned either to the control group or one of the 
experimental groups in the first two studies. All visual nudges were presented on the login page 
of the web application where password creation took place. The control group saw the standard 
login interface. 
 
We ensured that password recovery in the case of forgotten passwords was relatively simple. 
Participants could request a one-time code via a password reset button, which was then emailed 
to their registered email address. Typing or copying the one-time code into the reset text field on 
the website allowed them to define a new password.  
 
The three studies took place between October 2014 and April 2017, with each study running for 
a full academic year. 
 
Choosing Nudges 
The nudges tested in each study will be described along with the method and results of that 
study. However, the following general thoughts influenced the choice of nudges. 
 
Current efforts to encourage stronger passwords focus primarily on the individual. Moreover, 
many of the current efforts focus on the conscious, deliberately processing mind, called System 2 
by Kahneman (2003, 2011). This includes educational efforts, statistical information or factual 
disclosure. Yet the reality is that many of our behaviours are triggered by our automatic 
processes in the so-called System 1, and this often happens before the conscious mind has even 
had time to deliberate. Research by Sunstein showed that people seem to prefer System 2 
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nudges, but their preference is not stable and can be influenced (Sunstein 2016). Asked to 
assume a significantly higher effectiveness of System 1 nudges, e.g. graphic warnings and 
default rules, people tended to change their preference towards System 1 nudges. Due to these 
inconclusive results, we tested System 1 as well as System 2 nudges. 
 
Situational and contextual aspects are important factors to consider and are often more powerful 
than individual motivations (Luck, et al. 2002). Thus, we tested nudges based on environmental 
influences and social norms of the society within which the individual functioned (Bateson, et al. 
2013). Because the users in this study were students, they were likely to be influenced by their 
School membership, and that of the wider University environment (Cialdini & Trost 1998, Orazi 
& Pizzetti 2015). 
 
Limitations 
The limitations of the study are presented here at an early stage of the paper to allow the reader 
to bear the limitations in mind when interpreting the results.  
 
Sample. The sample consisted of a natural cohort of university students who created passwords 
for their actual university account. This, on the one hand, is a major benefit in terms of the 
ecological validity of the studies. On the other hand, due to this real-life setting, it was not 
possible to control for, or collect, certain demographic criteria. Therefore, the sample might be 
skewed in the direction of predominantly technically-adept students enrolled in Computer 
Science so that our findings might not be generalizable. 
 
Ecological Validity. McGrath explains that research designs can only maximize one of three 
criteria: generalizability, precision, and realism (McGrath 1995). Research design is essentially a 
satisficing process, choosing which of these to favour, since no research design can maximize all 
of them. For example, conducting research via a survey maximizes generalizability over realism. 
Lab experiments are precise because the environment and confounding factors can be carefully 
controlled but they, too, can be unrealistic. In-the-wild studies are subject to multiple outside 
influences and take place in an uncontrolled environment. Hence their precision cannot be 
guaranteed. They do maximize realism. 
 
The studies we report here are realistic and ecologically valid, but this makes it much harder to 
rule out other influences that we cannot control or even anticipate. Yet lab-based authentication 
studies, being less realistic, might not deliver dependable results. Authenticating, using a 
password, is a habitual and costly activity, and when people perform authentication in a lab study 
the cost factor is significantly reduced. Their reactions arguably might not reflect their real-life 
habits. The evidence then has to be confirmed in a real-life experiment.  
 
In designing our research study, we decided to maximize realism, while acknowledging that 
precision and generalizability were not optimal. One consequence of this in-the-wild study is that 
we were subject to more constraints. In particular, because this system is used by students in a 
University environment, we had to have our interventions approved by the system support team. 
In a perfect research design we would have split the students in Study 3 into two groups: a 
control without the nudge, and an experimental group with the nudge. Our support team 
considered this unacceptable. They argued that the experimental group would be subjected to 
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more stringent requirements than the other group, and this could lead to complaints. We 
therefore applied the treatment to the entire cohort, and compared their passwords to the previous 
year’s cohort of Study 2. While not ideal, we, too, satisficed: maximizing realism in order to 
monitor real-life password choice in response to choice architecture manipulations. 
 
Password Strength Estimation. As described above, password strength was measured using the 
five-point score value provided by zxcvbn.js (Wheeler 2016). We chose this mechanism because 
it allowed us to calculate password strength on the client’s machine, so that we did not transmit 
the unhashed password to the server. However, this particular artificial categorization of 
password guessability has two disadvantages. First, the scale is ordinal and therefore requires the 
use of nonparametric tests that, generally speaking, have a slightly reduced test power, as 
compared to parametric tests. Second, the categorization decreases the variance of the data that 
makes it more difficult to detect existing differences between groups. More fine-grained scales 
such as the log10 of the number of guesses might have a better chance of detecting existing 
effects, but unfortunately could not be calculated for this research because the original data had 
to be deleted in line with ethics requirements and was not available for recalculating and 
comparing different password strength metrics. For a broader discussion of the issue and its 
implications see Renaud & Zimmermann (2017). 
 
Longitudinal analysis. Due to the real-world setting, and our intention to replicate findings, the 
three studies that are described below were conducted in a sequential order and thus at different 
points in time. Therefore, it is not possible to exclude all external effects such as hacking event 
coverage in the media, political or regulatory processes or global developments that might have 
influenced participant behaviour or awareness in any form. Still, we can at least exclude 
influences within the direct university context of the study. Throughout the studies no major 
security interventions, awareness campaigns or changes of password policies occurred and can 
thus be excluded as explanations for changes in the participants’ behaviour.  
 
 
Study 1: methodology and results 
Experimental Conditions 
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Figure 1: Nudges Trialled in Study 1 
 
In Study 1, five different nudges and a control group were tested against each other. The nudges 
displayed in Figure 1 were designed in the following way: 
 
• IV0: Control. The control group was presented with the standard registration page that 
asked users to “Choose a Password”. 
 
• IV1: Priming. Targeted at the System 1, this nudge set out to test the priming effect 
(Hermans, et al. 1994) of “Choose a password”. Thus, the phrase was replaced with 
“Choose a Secret” and the number of entries including “password” or “secret” were 
counted. 
 
• IV2: University Context. This nudge made use of the expectation effect and social 
norms and was targeted at System 2. Instead of mandating password strength 
requirements, the static graphic displayed in Figure 2 creates the general impression that 
the average student’s password is weaker than suggested, and thus that the password to 
be created for the university account ought to be stronger. We expected the participants 
with the red “all students” password profile in the middle and to notice the gap between 
the actual and “expected” password strength. To test the effect of the graphic in isolation 
and in contrast to IV4, no additional information or feedback on actual password strength 
was provided to the participants. The graphic was static to make sure that all participants 
saw the same graphic and to avoid effects based on differences in the graphic.  
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• IV3: School Context. The design of this nudge is similar to IV2, but instead of referring 
to the broader university context this one used the school context, the peer group of the 
participants. The nudge is based on the finding that people identify with their In-Group 
members (Brewer 2001), and are strongly influenced by their behaviours (Castano, et al. 
2002). Thus, we suggested that participants identify themselves with students within their 
school, referred to as SoCS (Figure 3). 
 
• IV4: University Context and Feedback. In IV4 the Expectation Effect graph (Figure 2) 
used in IV2 was combined with an interactive password strength meter (Egelman, et al. 
2013, Sotirakopoulos 2011) superimposed over it. This would allow the user to see where 
on the x-axis their password was located, in terms of strength, as they entered it. The 
assumption was that the combination of the graphic with feedback, as provided by speed 
indicators in the driving context, might well be more effective than their deployment in 
isolation.  
 
• IV5: School Context and Feedback. This nudge was similar to IV4, but using the 
School Context (Figure 3) in combination with the same dynamic strength feedback 
indicator as IV4. 
 
 
Figure 2: IV2 University Context Nudge Graph (Rosenthal & Jacobson 1968).  
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Figure 3: IV3 School Context Nudge Graph (Castano, et al. 2002).  
 
 
Results 
The median is reported as x͂, means are reported with 𝑥 and the standard deviation with σ. 
Overall, the average password strength was rated with 𝑥  = 1.64 (σ = 1.41) and x͂ = 1. The 
average password length was 𝑥 = 9.59 (σ = 3.25) and x͂ = 9. The shortest password comprised 3, 
the longest 32 characters. Further descriptive statistics are provided in (Renaud & Zimmermann 
2017). Due to the non-normal sampling distribution and the password strength being measured 
on an ordinal scale, Mann-Whitney-U tests were conducted to compare each experimental 
condition with the control group. All statistics are conducted on a significance level of α = .05, 
but corrected following the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg 1995) to 
minimize multiple comparison error rates. The tests were run for both the password length and 
strength. Password strength did not differ between the Priming Group (IV1) with N=86 
participants and the control group (IV0) with N=82 participants. Only two uses of “secret” as a 
password were counted. Furthermore, in no group was “password” used as a password, which 
offers no support for the priming effect in this context. 
 
Likewise there was no significant difference between the control group and the conditions 
University Context (IV2, N=83), School Context (IV3, N = 81), University Context and 
Feedback (IV4, N=82), and School Context and Feedback (IV5, N = 83).  
 
Password length, as one factor contributing to password strength, did not differ significantly 
between any experimental and the control group. Even though insignificant, all test results are 
presented in table 1. The effect size r can be interpreted as follows: Values below .3 indicate a 
small effect, values between .3 and .5 are interpreted as medium effects and values above .5 
represent large effects. 
 
Comparison 
of IV0 and: 
Password strength Password length 
x͂ standardized 
test metric z 
p-value r 𝑥 (σ) standardized 
test metric z 
p-value r 
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IV0 1    9.46 (3.83)    
IV1 1 -0.351 .726 .03 8.91 (2.72) -0.357 .710 .03 
IV2 1 -1.084 .278 .08 9.95 (3.51) -1.231 .218 .10 
IV3 1 -1.251 .211 .09 10.33 (3.57) -1.953 .051 .15 
IV4 2 -2.207 .027* .17 9.76 (2.53) -1.757 .079 .14 
IV5 1 -0.439 .661 .03 9.17 (3.01) -0.589 .556 .05 
*This value was interpreted as insignificant following the p-value correction after Benjamini and 
Hochberg.  
Table 1. Results of the Mann-Whitney U tests comparing control group and experimental groups 
in Study 1.  
 
Discussion 
There was good reason to trial these authentication nudges, based on the success of similarly 
designed nudges in other disciplines and in encouraging privacy-aware behaviours, a closely-
related field. Yet the nudges made no difference. Based on these findings, we reflected on the 
results in search of possible explanations. 
 
Possible reasons for the outcome include statistical aspects such as the effect being too small to 
be detected given the decreased variance of the password strength scores discussed in the 
limitations section and with the non-parametric analytical tools we used. Other challenges related 
to testing authentication nudges, which are described in more detail in (Renaud & Zimmermann 
2017), include the tendency to reuse passwords that might have prevented the nudge from 
influencing password choice. It is impossible to detect such behavior in a study that only 
considers the passwords in one system.  
 
However, Sunstein (2017) offers an explanation following a different line of argument. 
According to Sunstein, nudges can also be ineffective because the choice they want people to 
favour is not in line with the user’s qualified best knowledge. In other words, the user knows 
better than the nudge designer. 
 
In the context of this research, the explanation might be viable if we knew that users had a sound 
understanding of password security. However, this assumption seems unfounded. 
 
First, studies by Ur, et al. (2015, 2016) showed that the users’ security perceptions of, and the 
strategies to create, passwords are often based on misconceptions. For example, some 
participants thought that appending a digit to a password instead of only using letters would 
inherently make a password stronger. Others overestimated the security of keyboard-pattern 
passwords. 
 
Second, the participants in our study, computer science students and therefore probably more 
knowledgeable than the average end-user, created passwords with an average security rating of  𝑥 = 1.64 (σ = 1.41) and x͂ = 1 out of 4 possible points. This could be an indication that either the 
participants’ knowledge, and thus their “perceived qualified choice”, was deficient, or that our 
nudges were not helpful in converting existing knowledge to password choices. For instance, 
IV2 only conveyed the message that passwords ought to be stronger but didn’t provide 
information on how to achieve this or feedback on password strength.  
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In line with Sunstein’s suggestion for failed nudges where there is good reason to believe that the 
user’s choice might either be biased or based on misunderstanding, we decided to test another set 
of nudges. To strengthen confidence in our previous findings, and to exclude influences that may 
have affected Study 1’s sample, Study 2 also included some of Study 1’s treatments. 
 
Study 2: methodology and results 
Experimental Conditions 
The second study replicated IV0 (Control), IV2 (University Context) and IV3 (School Context), 
and also introduced two previously untested combination nudges by adding reflection to the two 
contextual nudges. Furthermore, a social norm nudge was added. All nudges are depicted in 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Nudges trialled in Study 2 
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Study 2 thus assigned participants randomly to one of the following groups: 
 
• IV0: Control. Replication of Study 1. 
 
• IV2: University Context. Replication of Study 1.  
 
• IV3: School Context. Replication of Study 1. 
 
• IV6: University Context and Reflection. This nudge was aimed at requiring participants 
to reflect on the strength of the password they are providing to engage the more 
deliberative part of the brain (System 2). This treatment thus displays the same image as 
IV2, and asks the user to rate the strength of the password he or she has just entered. The 
instruction referred to them as ‘a student’ in order to highlight their University affiliation. 
 
• IV7: School Context and Reflection. This group displayed the same image as IV3, and 
also asked the user to rate the strength of their password. This time, the students were 
referred to as ‘a computing science student’ to invoke their identification with the school. 
 
• IV8: Social Norm. In addition to the standard registration page this group was presented 
with a picture of a pair of eyes to determine whether the perception of being watched 
would encourage stronger passwords. For example, a picture of eyes on a wall appearing 
to “watch”, which was used in a study by Bateson, made people more likely to pay into 
an honesty box (Bateson, et al. 2013). We wanted to test whether the idea of being 
watched would make people sufficiently security-aware that they would choose stronger 
passwords. 
 
Results 
Due to a problem with the strength estimator, the data sets of 39 participants had to be excluded, 
reducing the total number of participants to 737. Overall, password length ranged from 4 to 25 
characters with a mean of =10.02(σ =2.57) and a median of x͂ = 9. The medium password 
strength was 𝑥 = 1.80 (σ = 1.47) with a median of x͂ = 2. The participants were nearly equally 
distributed between the experimental conditions. The control group, IV2, IV3 and IV8 comprised 
124 participants each. IV 6 and IV 7 comprised 120 and 121 participants, respectively. 
 
As in Study 1, ordinal password strength scales, as well as deviations from a normal distribution 
in case of the metric password length data, led to the use of non-parametric tests. The five 
experimental groups were tested against the control group in Benjamini-Hochberg corrected 
pairwise comparisons using Mann-Whitney U tests. However, none of the experimental groups 
differed significantly from the control group, either in terms of password strength or length (see 
Table 2). 
 
Comparison 
of IV0 and: 
Password strength Password length 
x͂ standardized 
test metric z 
p-value r 𝑥 (σ) standardized 
test metric z 
p-
value 
r 
IV0 2    10.13 (2.70)    
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IV2  1 -1.054 .292 .07 10.02 (2.77) -0.569 .569 .04 
IV3  2 -1.150 .251 .07 9.80 (2.42) -0.913 .361 .06 
IV6  2 -0.554 .580 .04 10.23 (2.56) -0.611 .541 .04 
IV7  1 -1.203 .229 .08 10.06 (2.73) -0.191 .849 .01 
IV8  1 -1.405 .160 .09 9.88 (2.24) -0.336 .737 .02 
Table 2. Results of the Mann-Whitney U tests comparing control group and experimental groups 
in Study 2.  
 
Discussion 
We realized that privacy and authentication were fundamentally different in a way that made 
purely visual nudges less likely to be efficacious in the latter context. Privacy nudges entail 
people having a choice between two fairly equivalent options, and the nudge persuades them to 
choose the wiser option (Choe, et al. 2013, Jeske, et al. 2014). Nudging in authentication does 
not match this pattern of use. The authentication nudge attempts to propel people towards a more 
effortful and costly course of action. 
 
It is likely that the simple user interface tweak nudges were not powerful enough to persuade 
people to invest time and effort in terms of choosing stronger passwords. Password choice 
invokes entrenched habits and automated behaviours. Such pre-existing counter-nudges make 
achieving behavioural change far more of a challenge (Sunstein 2017). 
 
Next, the nudges used in this study attempted to influence password creation. However, several 
studies have shown that users tend to re-use passwords across websites. A recent study by Wash 
et al. (Wash, et al. 2016) found that people were particularly likely to re-use passwords that were 
entered frequently, such as passwords for university accounts. If this were the case no password 
creation process took place and could not be influenced by any purely visual user interface 
nudge. 
 
Our findings, together with those of other less than successful authentication nudges (Ciampa 
2013, Egelman, et al. 2013), convinced us that we needed to follow Sunstein’s (2017) third 
recommendation: to add an economic incentive. We decided to enrich the nudge to give it more 
power in this context, characterized by existing habitual behaviours. The aim was to develop an 
intervention that was influential enough to persuade students to create stronger passwords. 
 
Our third intervention offered the users a benefit for choosing stronger passwords. They were 
rewarded with more durable passwords (extended expiration periods), in a scheme similar to the 
suggestion made by (Seitz, et al. 2016, Walters 2007, Childress, et al. 2013). Moreover, in a 
survey carried out by Tam, et al. (2010) participants responded positively to the idea of this 
scheme. 
 
To test the new intervention, we formulated a three-pronged approach, the first a user interface 
tweak (a simple nudge) the second, the mainstay of economic theory: utility (an incentive), the 
third: making prominent, at every system usage, a reminder of the password expiration date (a 
reminder). 
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This hybrid nudge was based on the same premise as the previous study: a manipulation of the 
interface that would communicate with the user, perhaps partly subconsciously, to influence their 
choices (the nudge), accompanied by an incentive and a reminder. 
 
The idea of offering an incentive to prompt action is based on the concept of utility. The 
fundamental idea behind neo-classical economics is that people maximize “utility” when they 
make choices (Jevons 1879). They weigh up the costs and benefits of each choice option and 
choose the option that is “best” for them personally. Such an internal utility calculation is 
possible, and rational, if the information about the choices is complete. If the information is 
imperfect, on the other hand, Kelman (1979) explains that fully rational choice becomes 
impossible. Hence our intervention removed uncertainty: we told people exactly what the 
consequences of their choice was. It was unambiguously displayed as they chose and typed in 
their password. 
 
The idea of providing a reminder is based on the fact that people easily forget about things that 
are not frequently brought to their attention, especially in a world of information overload (Misra 
& Stokols 2012, Pijpers 2010). We considered that we ought to counteract this tendency by 
displaying information about the remaining lifetime of their password every time they used the 
system. 
 
In effect, participants who chose stronger passwords had to change their passwords less 
frequently than those who chose weaker passwords (the incentive). The simple nudge made this 
prominent as and when they were formulating a password. The reminder ensured that they were 
prompted, frequently, about the password expiration date. 
 
Study 3: methodology and results 
Experimental Conditions 
As described above, and because none of the interventions tested in Studies 1 and 2 had any 
significant impact on password length or strength, a different intervention was tested in the third 
study. The aim of the Study 3 was to trial the hybrid nudge (Figure 5): essentially the 
combination of three interventions: 
 
Simple Nudge 
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Reminder  
 
Incentive  
 
 
Figure 5. Hybrid Nudge: A Simple Nudge, an Incentive and a Reminder 
 
IV9: Hybrid Authentication Nudge: 
1 Simple Nudge: An image of an overly long dachshund is displayed above the password 
entry field. The length of the dog and the reputation of this particular breed for strength 
would, we hoped, communicate a subtle message to the participants: emulate the hound. 
Even if they did not know much about the breed they could hardly miss the presence of 
the nudge, and we hoped this would make them pay attention to its message. A speech 
bubble emerges from the dog’s mouth, telling them that the stronger the password, the 
longer they could keep it. 
2 Incentive: As they type in their password, the length of time the password can be retained 
is dynamically updated. This communicates a direct benefit related to stronger password 
choice. 
3 Reminder: Remind users, every time they log in, how much longer their password is 
valid for, and provide a handy button to facilitate a convenient password change. 
 
The general procedure was similar to the previous studies except for the fact that all participants 
were assigned to the same experimental condition. This was because the school’s IT support 
required that all students, whether participating in the study or not, be treated equally. Having a 
treatment group with the hybrid nudge encompassing expiring passwords based on password 
strength and a control group not having expiring passwords was considered to constitute unequal 
treatment and therefore not permitted. This constraint led us to administer the hybrid nudge to all 
students, but also left us without a control group to compare the results to. As a replacement, we 
compared the entire Study 3 cohort to the previous year’s Study 2 cohort. 
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Still, this comparison was not trivial. A number of the participants in Study 3 had previously 
participated in Study 2 (repeated measures). Due to some opting out, others enrolling for the first 
time and withdrawal of graduating students, other students only participated in Study 3 and had 
no previous experience of nudges in this context (independent measures). We solved the issue by 
selecting participants post-hoc by means of their anonymized identifiers and were thus able to 
avoid confounding repeated and independent measures analysis. Hence, we conducted different 
analyses for the two groups as described in the results section. 
 
Results 
Analogue to Study 1 and 2, the data of the N=672 participants in Study 3 was first analysed in 
terms of preconditions for statistical procedures and descriptive statistics. In total, password 
length ranged from 3 to 44 characters with a mean of 𝑥 = 11.35 (σ = 3.90) and a median of x͂ = 
10. The medium password strength was 𝑥 = 2.66 (σ = 1.29) and x͂ = 3, and ranged from 0 to 4. 
Further descriptive statistics for the sample in Study 3 are shown in the first row of Table 1. 
 
Comparison between Study 2 and Study 3 
As described above, the participants consisted of a natural cohort of students and therefore 301 
participants took part in both Studies 2 and 3 (repeated measures), that means they were included 
in the participant numbers of both studies. Subtracting the 301 participants from both samples 
left 436 participants that have only taken part in Study 2 and 371 participants that have only 
taken part in Study 3 (independent measures).  
 
One might expect people who had already participated in a password study to be more aware of 
password security, thus participants who had already taken part in Study 2 might have been 
biased by their allocation to a previous experimental condition. However, we found no 
significant differences concerning password strength between the 371 people who participated 
only in Study 3 (x͂ = 3) and the 301 participants who had previously participated in Study 2 as 
well (x͂	= 3), Z(301, 371) = -0.718, p = .473, r = .03. The same is true for password length (x͂ = 11 
and x͂ = 10) with Z(301,371) = -0.103, p = .918, r < .01. Nevertheless, as other effects cannot be 
excluded, and to avoid conflating repeated and independent measures, the two groups were 
treated separately when conducting the comparison between Studies 2 and 3.	
 
Repeated Measures: 
Nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were used for the comparisons between the password 
length and strength in Study 2 and Study 3 after the inspection of the data. Overall, the 301 
participants that had taken part in both studies created significantly longer (x͂ = 2 and 3, Z(301) = 
-9.860, p < .001, r = .56) and stronger (x͂ = 9 and 10, Z(301) = -7.235, p < .001, r = .42) 
passwords in Study 3 compared to Study 2. The effect size r can be interpreted as follows: 
Values below .3 indicate a small effect, values between .3 and .5 are interpreted as medium 
effects and values above .5 represent large effects.  
 
The following pairwise comparisons listed in Table 3 revealed the same effect not only for the 
students of the control group in Study 2, but also for every tested nudge. All tests were 
conducted using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure for the correction of p-values. 
Comparison 
of IV9-RM 
Password strength Password length 
x͂ standardized p-value r 𝑥 (σ) standardized p-value r 
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and: test metric test metric 
IV9-RM 3    11.36 (3.78)    
IV0 2 -4.241 <.001 .24 10.23 (2.69) -3.095 .002 .18 
IV2 1 -3.666 <.001 .21 9.98 (2.41) -2.622 .009 .15 
IV3 2 -3.452 .001 .20 10.10 (2.86) -2.168 .030 .12 
IV6 2 -3.655 <.001 .21 10.18 (3.25) -2.549 .011 .15 
IV7 1 -4.813 <.001 .28 9.29 (2.14) -3.638 <.001 .21 
IV8 1 -4.265 <.001 .25 9.76 (2.12) -3.600 <.001 .21 
 
 
Table 3. Results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests comparing the repeated measures group of 
Study 3 (IV9-RM) and the experimental groups of Study 2.  
 
Independent Measures: 
As described above, there were 436 students who participated only in Study 2 and 371 who 
participated only in Study 3. In general, a Mann-Whitney U test revealed that the participants 
that only took part in Study 3 (x͂ = 3) created significantly stronger passwords than the 
participants that only took part in Study 2 (x͂	= 2), Z(436, 371) = -7.595, p < .001, r  = .27. 
Analogue, the passwords in Study 3 (x͂ = 1) were significantly longer than in Study 2 (x͂ = 10), 
Z(436, 371) = -4.929, p < .001, r = .17. The following pairwise comparisons (Table 4) that were 
corrected using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure revealed significant differences in password 
strength between every experimental condition in Study 2 and IV9 in Study 3. Similar results 
were found for password length, except that the differences between IV3 and IV9 and IV7 and 
IV9 were not significant. 
 
Comparison 
of IV9-IM 
and  
Password strength Password length 
x͂ standardized 
test metric 
p-value r 𝑥 (σ) standardized 
test metric 
p-value r 
IV9-IM 3    11.35 (4.01)    
IV0 2 -3.423 .001 .16 10.04 (2.72) -3.034 .002 .14 
IV2 2 -4.961 <.001 .23 9.68 (2.42) -4.060 .009 .19 
IV3 2 -2.863 .004 .14 10.32 (2.36) -1.706 .088 .08 
IV6 1 -5.899 <.001 .28 9.97 (2.33) -2.952 .003 .14 
IV7 2 -3.899 <.001 .18 10.34 (2.22) -1.501 .133 .07 
IV8 2 -4.234 <.001 .20 10.19 (3.14) -2.925 .003 .14 
Table 4. Results of the Mann-Whitney U tests comparing the independent measures group of 
Study 3 (IV9-IM) and the experimental groups of Study 2.  
 
Discussion & Reflection 
This research aimed to investigate the influence of authentication nudges on password creation. 
It yields at least two noteworthy results. The first is that we were not able to detect any 
significant increase in password length or password strength following the eight user interface 
tweak simple nudges tested in the first and second studies. This indicated that habitual password 
choice behaviours were not going to be budged by a simple visual nudge. This led us to deploy 
something more powerful in study 3. 
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The second noteworthy finding is that the hybrid nudge tested in the third study was indeed 
successful. Similar to many nudges and other forms of intervention, the hybrid nudge comprised 
three aspects: the image of the sausage dog graphically encouraging stronger passwords (simple 
nudge), the incentive of later password expiration dates and a reminder of that in the form of a 
text. Including an incentive slightly exceeded the definition of a simple nudge (Selinger & 
Whyte 2012). Due to the testing of a combination of interventions, it is not possible to isolate the 
influence of the separate aspects nor their interplay.	It is, of course, possible that the economic 
benefit explains the positive effect, as economic incentives are seen as the “stronger” 
interventions as compared to pure nudges in the literature. Hence we can only conclude that the 
hybrid nudge as a whole was successful. Many interventions are actually a combination of 
interventions on a different level of analysis. Consider, for example, password strength meters. It 
is likely that the general feedback effect they exert interacts with the visualization of the strength 
meters in terms of aspects such as colour coding, warning messages or wording in the case of 
textual feedback. 
 
Even though testing effects in isolation and carefully varying single parameters provides an 
important direction for future research, the analysis of every aspect in isolation isn’t always 
suitable. For instance, showing a reminder of an incentive that isn’t administered at the same 
time would lead to confusion instead of stronger passwords. Furthermore, as this research shows, 
designing and validating successful authentication nudges isn’t as trivial as it seems. In this case, 
we needed to enrich the pure (simple) nudge concept by adding an incentive and a reminder. 
 
The hybrid nudge significantly improved both password length and strength as measured with 
the same score metric used in the previous studies. This is so, not only as compared to the control 
group in Study 2, but also for all Study 2’s nudge groups individually. Furthermore, this effect 
was valid both for those who had taken part in the previous study and for those who had not been 
exposed to previous nudges. As discussed in the limitations section, no significant event such as 
an IT security awareness campaign had taken place between study 2 and 3, and can thus be 
excluded as possible explanation for the change. 
 
However, the replacement of a classical control group with the previous study’s participants, 
although the closest comparison we could carry out given the IT support’s constraints, is not 
straightforward. Apart from possible confounding factors due to some students participating in 
both, as compared to a single study, it was not possible to control the sequence in which the 
students participating in both studies experienced the experimental conditions. Given the 
sequential nature of the studies, all of them first experienced the nudges shown in study 2 and 
later the hybrid nudge of study 3. Due to the lack of randomization it is not possible to exclude 
any sequential effects on the results. 
 
Still, the primary difference between the studies, we believe, is related to the certainty provided 
by the hybrid nudge. It is impossible to provide anyone with a certain benefit of a strong 
password, or with an exact benefit scale related to a password strength scale. Whenever people 
are usually asked to create stronger passwords it is presented almost as a moral good. 
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People are told that strong passwords are better able to repel the efforts of hackers, and indeed 
they are. However, the threat is indeterminate, the risks unquantified and unquantifiable 
(Dell’Amico, et al. 2010), and the benefits even harder to be certain about. Hence a strong 
password is “better” but no one can communicate to a layperson how much more protection a 
strong password provides in return for significant mental and inconvenience costs. Uncertainty 
pervades the password choice decision process. 
 
There is also a cost that increases as passwords become stronger: short-term memorization and 
long-term retrieval, as well as typing cost every time it is used, which is not insignificant for 
strong passwords (Greene, et al. 2014, Tari, et al. 2006). It is likely that the cost related to a 
strong password is more prominent in the user’s mind: the benefit might, or might not, 
materialize at some future date. 
 
Future discounting (Newell & Pizer, 2003), the principle of least effort (Zipf 2016, Kool, et al. 
2010), and biased optimism (Lench & Ditto 2008) thus combine to weaken passwords. 
 
The hybrid nudge succeeded because it reduced uncertainty, made the benefit salient, and made 
the internal cost-benefit calculation easier. So, instead of an admonition to “choose strong 
passwords” with uncertain benefit, they had something they could reckon with, something clear 
and unambiguous. With the hybrid nudge, it became a trade-off between the effort of 
memorizing a single strong password and the effort involved in changing passwords more 
frequently. The users chose more durable stronger passwords. The idea of changing passwords is 
clearly more cognitively demanding and daunting than the memorizing of a single strong 
password with the advantage of being able to amortise that effort over an extended period of 
time. 
 
What is attractive about the hybrid nudge is that it is a relatively low-cost solution for 
organisations. 
 
 
Future work 
This study augments the growing body of evidence from other studies into the deployment of 
nudges during authentication. We undoubtedly benefited from the findings of other researchers 
working in this field. We believe that it would be of great benefit if everyone exploiting 
behavioural science techniques in the authentication context could share good practice. We hope 
to launch a community to achieve this. By pooling all our findings we can improve 
authentication design and share our insights with practitioners and developers. The aim is to 
encourage the use of empirically-validated techniques rather than relying on traditional measures 
that might not achieve much in the way of improved security. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
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The first two studies reported in this paper investigated the viability of a number of simple visual 
nudges in the authentication context. We trailed eight nudges in two studies, thereby 
manipulating the choice architecture to encourage stronger passwords. We discovered that the 
password strengths were fairly equal across all experimental conditions, regardless of any 
displayed nudges. 
 
We then conducted a third study that tested a hybrid nudge, comprising a simple nudge, an 
incentive and a reminder. This hybrid nudge delivered a significantly positive result: longer and 
stronger passwords. 
 
We conclude that users can indeed be prompted to choose a strong password, but only if the 
benefits thereof are clear and unambiguous. Moreover, when we are trying to persuade folks to 
behave in a way that is contrary to a frequently practiced habitual routine, it should be borne in 
mind that a simple choice architecture tweak is unlikely to succeed. One has to enrich the nudge, 
and to make the benefits of the “wiser” option salient and desirable. This has a far greater chance 
of changing entrenched behaviours. 
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